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Background: Surgical safety checklists (SSCs) are designed to improve team communication and consistency in
care, ultimately avoiding complications. In Colorado, hospitals reported that use of SSCs was standard practice, but
a statewide survey indicated that SSC use was inconsistent. The purpose of this project was to directly observe the
compliance with the SSC in Colorado hospitals, through direct observation of the perioperative checklist process.
Methods: Ten hospitals participated in a quality improvement initiative. Trained team members recorded compliance
with each of the components of the SSC. Data analysis was performed using a chi-squared test or ANOVA, depending
on the number of categorical variables, with p < 0.05 determining statistical significance.
Results: Ten hospitals representing statewide diversity submitted 854 observations (median 98, range 24–106).
83% of cases were elective, 13% urgent, and 4% emergent/trauma. There was significant variation across hospitals
in: team introductions, cessation of activity, affirming correct procedure, assessing hypothermia risk, need for beta
blocker, or VTE prophylaxis. Uniformly poor compliance was observed with respect to assessment of case duration, blood
loss, anesthesiologists’ concerns, or display of essential imaging. Only 71% of observers reported active participation by
physicians; 9% reported that “the majority did not pay attention” and 4% reported that the team was “just going through
the motions”. There were significant differences among surgical specialty groups in the majority of the elements.
Conclusion: SSCs have been implemented by the vast majority of hospitals in our state; however, compliance with SSC
completion in the operating room has wide variation and is generally suboptimal. Although this study was not designed
to correlate SSC compliance with outcomes, there are concerns about the risk of a sentinel event or unanticipated
complication resulting from poor preparation.
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Sentinel eventsBackground
In 2009, The New England Journal of Medicine published
a special article entitled, A Surgical Safety Checklist to Re-
duce Morbidity and Mortality in a Global Population [1].
This study, supported by the World Health Organization
(WHO), described the use of a 19-item surgical safety
checklist (SSC) that was designed to improve team com-
munication and consistency in care in the perioperative* Correspondence: walter.biffl@dhha.org
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unless otherwise stated.period. After implementation of the WHO SSC in eight
diverse institutions around the globe, there were statisti-
cally significant reductions in the rates of death and com-
plications [1]. Following this publication, use of checklists
was broadly embraced and strongly encouraged by groups
such as WHO and the Institute for Healthcare Improve-
ment, to the point that use of SSCs was mandated in the
UK and Canada [2-4]. In the United States, many hospitals
implemented surgical checklists, often adapting the ori-
ginal WHO SSC to fit individual facility needs [5,6].
Momentum behind checklist initiatives has grown asis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
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tion of SSCs is associated with reductions in postopera-
tive complications and mortality [7-10].
In Colorado in 2010, the Colorado Hospital Association
(CHA) partnered with the Colorado Medical Society and
COPIC- the major medical liability carrier for physicians
and hospitals in Colorado- to modify and standardize
the WHO checklist to include other Joint Commission
requirements as well as Surgical Care Improvement
Project (SCIP) measures (Figure 1). In a subsequent CHA
survey, over 90% of responding hospitals reported imple-
mentation of the “Colorado SSC” in their surgical areas
(CHA, unpublished data). However, CHA and COPIC
were concerned that the failure to consistently review
all of the checklist items might put patients at risk of
“Never Events” such as wrong-patient/wrong-site proce-
dures or retained foreign bodies [11]. In fact, in spite of
the promulgation of National Patient Safety Goals, these
events had continued to occur in Colorado [12]. The pur-
pose of this quality improvement project was to observe
the level of compliance with discrete components of theFigure 1 The Colorado hospital association surgical safety checklist. B
Surgical Care Imptrovement Project initiatives.SSC in Colorado hospitals, through direct observation of
the perioperative checklist process.
Methods
This observational quality improvement project was car-
ried out between September 2012 and April 2013 at ten
selected Colorado hospitals. As a quality improvement
project, it was exempt from Institutional Review Board
approval, and individual patients’ protected health infor-
mation was never collected or transmitted. The hospitals
were selected by COPIC and CHA with the goal of en-
suring a representative sample of urban vs rural and
academic vs community hospitals; in addition, some
hospitals were primarily insured by COPIC, and some
were not. All facilities that were invited to participate
agreed to do so, and all ten completed the project.
A preliminary meeting was held in which representatives
from CHA and the ten hospitals discussed the hospitals’
current surgical workflow and checklist use. There was no
implementation intervention performed; this project was
intended to assess existing levels of compliance. It wasased on the World Health Organization checklist, this incorporated
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SSC elements would be used as the basis for comparison.
A standardized assessment tool- the CHA “Surgical Safety
Assessment (SSA)” form (Figure 2)- was created for the
observations. The SSA form was designed to reflect the
typical surgical workflow, and thus varied slightly from
the CHA SSC form. For example, the display of essential
imaging and choice of appropriate venous thromboembol-
ism (VTE) prophylaxis is generally the responsibility of
the surgeon, so these observations were grouped in the
“Time Out” section, when the surgeon would be present,
rather than the “Prior to Anesthesia” section, when the
surgeon is not typically present.
Once the SSA form was completed and distributed, a
final workshop was held in which the observers from each
site were trained to use the SSA form and to perform ob-
servations as discreetly as possible, without the knowledge
of the operating team. The observer was generally a mem-
ber of the operating room (OR) staff, whose presence
would not raise suspicion, but who was not directly in-
volved in that procedure. In addition to review of theFigure 2 The surgical safety assessment form. This observation tool wa
It was modified to group items according to the perioperative workflow, fosafety elements, the observers recorded team participa-
tion, the role and participation of physicians, and what
they perceived as barriers to consistent use. The completed
assessments, which contained no protected health infor-
mation or other patient-identifying information, were sub-
mitted to CHA, where information from the SSA forms
was entered into a database.
Each hospital was asked to perform 100 observations.
This was intended to avoid having the sample size
dominated by the busiest hospitals. The hospitals were
also requested to perform observations in a case mix
that approximated their overall case mix (eg, urgent:
elective cases, and across specialties in a representative
approximation).
Statistical analysis
All statistical analyses were performed using SAS version
9.2 (SAS Inc., Carey, NC, USA). Data are expressed as
number (percentage). All outcomes were dichotomous cat-
egorical. Cell with either missing data or “non-applicable”
values were omitted from the analysis; as such the totals based on the Colorado Hospital Association Surgical Safety Checklist.







Figure 4 Distribution of surgical specialty type (n = 854).
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differed. Analysis of independent variables was first
performed across all observations and then among the
following subgroups: 1) by hospital, 2) by specialty
(general surgery, orthopedic surgery, neurosurgery, and
other), and 3) by hospital infection rate (high vs. low, di-
chotomized around the median infection rate of 0.5%).
Differences in categorical variables between two groups
were assessed using the chi-squared test, unless expected
cell counts were less than 10, in which case Fischer’s exact
test was used. Differences in categorical variables between
more than two groups (e.g., specialty) were assessed
using ANOVA. The alpha error level was set at 0.05, with
p < 0.05 being considered statistically significant.
Results
The ten participating hospitals were diverse. Three were
rural and seven were urban/suburban. Two of the ten
hospitals were academic (ie, staffed with surgical residents),
and the other eight were community hospitals. Five were
designated as level I or II trauma centers by the State of
Colorado, and five were not. The original goal was 100
observations per site. A total of 854 observations were
made (per-hospital median 98, range 24–106). All hospitals
completed their observations within a 6-week time frame.
Overall, 83% of cases were elective, 13% were urgent, and
4% emergent/trauma (Figure 3). The majority of cases were
performed by orthopedic (32%) and general (30%) sur-
geons. Otolaryngologists performed 6% and neurosurgeons
5%; 24% were done by others (obstetrician/gynecologists,
oral/maxillofacial surgeons, plastic surgeons, etc.), and 2%
of cases had two or more surgical specialties involved
(Figure 4).
The SSA contains elements pertaining to a pre-anesthetic
timeout; compliance with these elements is listed in
Figure 5. There were three hospitals in which this was
completed ≤5% of the time, while in two hospitals, at
least some elements were reviewed >90% of the time.
Overall, the components of this segment of the SSA
were reviewed in fewer than 50% of patients.
Compliance with the pre-incision segment of the SSA
was better in several elements, but not all (Figure 6). In
nearly all (95-99%) cases the correct patient and procedureElective 84%
Urgent 13%
Emergent/Trauma 3%
Figure 3 Distribution of case type (n = 854).were verified, and the site was confirmed in 91% of
relevant cases. There was significant hospital-to-hospital
variation in addressing the following (overall mean in par-
entheses): team introductions (30%), cessation of activity
(77%), assessing hypothermia risk (48%), need for beta
blocker (23%), and VTE prophylaxis (65%). Uniformly
poor compliance, without significant variation, was ob-
served with respect to assessment of case duration (16%),
blood loss (19%), anesthesiologists’ concerns (39%), and dis-
play of essential imaging (36%). Interestingly but perhaps
not surprisingly, there were significant differences among
surgical specialty groups in the majority of the elements
(Figure 7). Compared with orthopedic and neurosurgeons,
general surgeons were less compliant with team introduc-
tions, addressing critical steps, case duration, blood loss,
anesthesia concerns, hypothermia risk, antibiotic adminis-
tration, or displaying imaging. Orthopedic surgeons were
less compliant with ceasing activity, and with assessing the
need for beta-blockers or VTE prophylaxis.
Only 71% of observers perceived active participation
by physicians; 9% reported that “the majority did not pay
attention” and 4% reported that the team was “just going
through the motions.” Compared with orthopedic and
neurosurgeons, general surgeons were more compliant
with active participation.
Discussion
In this observational study, we have found that although
over 90% of Colorado hospitals reported utilizing check-
lists in the OR, compliance with the Colorado SSC is con-
sistently inconsistent and incomplete. This is not unique
to Colorado. Pickering and colleagues [3] observed 294
operations performed over five different hospitals in the
United Kingdom, and reported results similar to ours:
although administrative audits indicated use of check-
lists in 95% of cases, active participation was observed
in only 73%, and all information was communicated in
just 55% of cases [3]. In the Netherlands, where checklist
use was mandated by the Dutch Health Care Inspectorate,
the checklist was fully completed in just 39% of cases [7].
In fact, as more studies have emerged, it has become clear
that checklist implementation does not equate with com-
pliance [8]. In one prospective observational study, Levy









Figure 5 Compliance with pre-anesthesia assessment checklist components prior to induction of anesthesia. * = significant variation
across hospitals, p < 0.05.
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completion of the preincision phase of the checklist, most
of the individual elements were either not addressed as
designed, or not addressed at all. Similarly, Sparks and
colleagues [14] found that in spite of a high level of overall
participation and completion, the accuracy was poor.
The finding of poor overall compliance was not
surprising- when Colorado hospitals had initially been
surveyed about checklist use by CHA, one-third had
raised concerns over the degree of active physician partici-
pation, and many suggested that the checklist is not con-
sistently used on every surgical case. The need for active
participation and a cultural change is a recurring theme in
checklist implementation literature [8,15,16]. O’Connor
and colleagues [17] examined the “human factors” in
interviews with operating team members, and identified
critical factors to improvement: 1) involvement of all
the operating team members in the checklist process;





Surgeon addresses case duration*
Reviewed and affirmed procedure
Reviewed and confirmed identity
Team Introductions
Pre-Incisi
Figure 6 Compliance with pre-incision time-out checklist components
across hospitals, p < 0.05.and training; and 4) breakdown of barriers to implementa-
tion. This project neither prescribed nor assessed imple-
mentation strategies. However, the barriers reported by
the observers in the present study were consistent with
these concepts.
In the present study, compliance varied across hospitals
and by elements of the checklist. Variation across hospitals
has been noted in other studies [3,18-20]. For example,
van Schoten and colleagues [19] found that compliance in
the Netherlands was inferior at academic hospitals, com-
pared with general hospitals and teaching hospitals. They
point out that the literature is mixed on whether large
or small hospitals perform better [19]. In the present
study, there was no statistical difference in compliance
between the five highest-volume hospitals and the five
lower-volume hospitals, although th e dichotomy was not
substantial. This may merit further study.
The pre-anesthesia timeout was performed sporadically in
the OR. This may have been due to the common practice of20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%
on Time-Out
prior to initiation of surgical procedure. * = significant variation
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%120%
VTE prophylaxis assessed*
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Anesthesiologist reviews…
Surgeon addresses blood loss*
Surgeon addresses case duration*
Surgeon addresses critical steps
Reviewed and affirmed procedure
Reviewed and affirmed site






Figure 7 Compliance with checklist components prior to initiation of surgical procedure, by procedure. * = significant variation across
specialty groups, p < 0.05.
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area just moments before the patient being transported into
the OR. Other elements of the pre-anesthesia assessment
might be performed by the anesthesiologist but not reviewed
with the nurses. In addition, the surgeon may not be present
in the OR prior to induction of anesthesia, so elements
might be “saved” for discussion with the surgeon. This is
something to be explored in the future.
The pre-incision timeout did not have as much variation
as the pre-anesthetic pause. Indeed, the culture of con-
firming patient/procedure/site seems to be well-ingrained.
In studies directly assessing compliance, these items are
consistently addressed [13,18]. On the other hand, ele-
ments that individually seem important are not routinely
reviewed. From a surgeon’s perspective, this is understand-
able to a degree. Team introductions are not necessary
if the team works together frequently; this may not have
been noted in the observations. “Critical steps” may not
seem necessary to review in “routine” procedures such as
cholecystectomy or hernia repair. Similarly, anesthesiolo-
gists’ concerns, anticipated blood loss, case duration, dis-
play of imaging, or hypothermia may not seem relevant to
brief, common procedures. However, it is important to re-
member that the checklist concept is designed to make a
habit of getting all of the team members to speak up, and
to discuss every item as they are individually important to
surgical planning.
A noteworthy, but probably not surprising, finding of
this study was that compliance with individual elements
of the SSC varied by surgical specialty. This has been re-
ported by others as well [18,19,21]. In the present study,
general surgeons were less compliant with team intro-
ductions, addressing critical steps, case duration, blood
loss, anesthesia concerns, hypothermia risk, antibiotic ad-
ministration, or displaying imaging. There may be a
variety of explanations for this. Teams that work togetherfrequently may not feel compelled to introduce themselves;
the observer may not have noted previous familiarity.
We did not record details of operative procedures, so it
is difficult to know whether critical steps, blood loss,
hypothermia risk, or imaging were relevant- if the ma-
jority of cases were routine procedures (eg, hernia repairs,
cholecystectomies) then it could be argued that such
points were not germaine. On the other hand, it is not
known whether unexpected occurrences arose during
any of these procedures, and how they were handled.
Orthopedic surgeons were less compliant with ceasing
activity, and with assessing the need for beta-blockers
or VTE prophylaxis. Without outcomes data (wrong site
procedures, perioperative myocardial infarctions, venous
thromboembolic events, etc.) it is not known whether or
not these failures are problematic. The fact that general
surgeons appear less compliant with certain measures
may simply be a reflection of case complexity. Of note,
although there is variability by surgical specialty, the
“nurse-driven” components of the SSC (e.g. patient and
site identity, and verification of instrument sterility) did
not show any variation across specialties. This suggests
that the nurses are consistent in initiating the SSC re-
view, but that review of many individual elements is left
to the surgeon. Interestingly, although the general sur-
geons were inferior in reviewing many checklist elements,
the observers felt that the general surgeons were more
compliant with active participation overall. This may indi-
cate an opportunity for teamwork training with certain
specialties/service lines.
The present study did not assess outcomes, but it is
assumed that poor compliance puts patients at risk. The
question is, what risk? Haynes and colleagues [1] reported
that death and postoperative complications improved
following implementation of SSCs. A before-and-after
cohort study in the Netherlands similarly found that, after
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was associated with a significant reduction in mortality
[7]. A subsequent review and meta-analysis- which included
both the Haynes [1] and van Klei [7] studies- con-
cluded that the evidence is “highly suggestive of a re-
duction in postoperative complications and mortality
following implementation of the WHO SSC”- but the au-
thors concluded that the evidence could not be regarded as
definitive in the absence of higher-quality studies [9]. In-
deed, a close look at the report of Haynes et al. [1] reveals
that five of the eight hospitals had no significant improve-
ment in the measured outcomes, and that baseline death
and complication rates were higher than what is reported
in US hospitals. And recently, Urbach and colleagues [4] re-
ported that large community hospitals in Ontario nearly all
reported checklist compliance in 99-100% of cases, and yet
there was no reduction in operative mortality or complica-
tions. It was speculated by the authors- [4] and by Leape
[22] in an accompanying editorial- that the failure to im-
prove outcomes may have been related to poor compliance
with checklist elements. However, without a clear link
between compliance and outcomes in controlled studies, it
is just as likely that the “positive” studies (e.g., Haynes et al.,
[1] van Klei et al. [7]) were confounded by the Hawthorne
effect or other unknown factors.
One might argue that it is unrealistic to expect that
completing a checklist in the OR will prevent mortality
or major surgical complications. The existing literature
does not indicate how often the checklist process identi-
fies or averts an error (“near-misses”) or enhances prep-
aration for a difficult case. On the other hand, there are
some outcomes that absolutely should improve or be
prevented altogether by reviewing a checklist. Appropri-
ate verification of patient, procedure and site should com-
pletely eliminate wrong patient/wrong site procedures.
Review of all SSC elements should also ensure compliance
with core measures, which has very real financial reper-
cussions for hospitals. In addition, a brief review of ex-
pected procedural steps and special equipment needs
should improve OR efficiency by having necessary equip-
ment readied in advance. Further, discussion of anticipated
critical steps and blood loss may enhance the team’s prep-
aration for dealing with challenging intraoperative events.
Finally, the open discourse is recognized to improve the
perception of teamwork.
A major strength of this study is that direct observa-
tions were performed surreptitiously by known members
of the operating room staff, thus minimizing the
Hawthorne effect. And recording of compliance with all
the checklist elements is far more accurate than a simple
“yes/no” recording of checklist use, or using surrogates
such as core measures data. The recording of additional
notations of perceived participation and teamwork, as well
as barriers, has allowed us to provide feedback to hospitalsthat they may use to further educate their staff and im-
prove compliance in the future. Another factor that mini-
mized potential Hawthorne effect was that there was no
formal implementation period. Hospitals were assessed
in their current state, so there was no “new change”
that might have waned over time.
A limitation of the current study is that the number of
urgent and emergent cases was relatively low, precluding
a separate analysis of those cases. It is generally assumed
that compliance is lower in such situations, so team
awareness of such challenges is important. In fact, van
Klei and colleagues [7] noted that compliance was poor
in urgent/emergent cases and cases involving sicker pa-
tients at higher risk of dying- and there was no improve-
ment in mortality in these cases. In the Safe Surgery Saves
Lives program, although compliance was not perfect, the
investigators found a significant improvement in checklist
compliance in urgent cases, and a significant reduction in
complications after urgent surgery [23]. Another limita-
tion is that details of case complexity were not recorded,
precluding our ability to address our hypothesis that many
elements were skipped on the basis of it being a “routine”
case.
Surgical outcomes were not specifically assessed in this
project. Prior to 2010, COPIC collected data on sentinel
events; since then, however, only claims data are available-
so it is not clear whether wrong patient/wrong site/wrong
procedure events were different. In addition, it was impos-
sible to link procedures to postoperative complications or
mortality due to de-identification of data. Even if it had
been available, the study was not designed to detect mor-
tality differences and was likely underpowered to do so in
the routine surgical population.
In sum, although most facilities report adoption and im-
plementation of a comprehensive checklist, consistent ad-
herence and multi-disciplinary participation with respect to
the surgical checklist remains suboptimal. These compre-
hensive lists are inclusive of elements such as appropriate
prophylactic antibiotic use prior to incision to lessen the
likelihood of surgical-associated infections and appropriate
surgical site marking – yet surgical site infections and
wrong site procedures continue to be a prevalent problem
in Colorado facilities. Surgical site infection (SSI) rates in
Colorado facilities have remained relatively similar in the
past two years and individual facility rates have largely not
made statistical improvements (i.e. moving from a statisti-
cally same national comparison to a statistically better na-
tional comparison). Clearly, evaluation of implementation,
consistent use, compliance and barriers are necessary
elements to further study the SSC in Colorado hospitals.
Conclusions
In conclusion, SSCs have been implemented by the vast
majority of hospitals in our state; however, compliance
Biffl et al. Patient Safety in Surgery  (2015) 9:5 Page 8 of 8with SSC completion in the OR has wide variation and
is generally suboptimal. Although this study was not
designate to correlate SSC compliance with outcomes,
there are concerns about the risk of a sentinel event or
unanticipated complication resulting from poor prepar-
ation. There are many intuitively clear benefits to the
use of SSCs, including: the absolute prevention of
wrong patient/wrong site surgery; compliance with Joint
Commission standards and National Hospital Inpatient
Quality Measures; and improvement of efficiency by
ensuring availability of important equipment and antici-
pation of contingencies. These outcomes are less easily
measured, yet every failure is ultimately costly. Use of
SSCs is important, and we feel that the focus should be
on supporting local implementation efforts. A second
phase of this project is under development to deter-
mine how compliance can be improved.
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